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ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT
COUNSEL.

WAS

DENIED

EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE

OF

Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
based upon the procedural nature of the proceeding and not merely
upon his counsel's failure to bargain properly as asserted by
Appellee.

Appellee claims that Appellant "has failed to overcome

the presumption

that

his representation

(Opposition Brief, p. 35.)

below was

inadequate.

However, statements made by Appellant's

attorney at the preliminary hearing (Prelim. Hearing Transcript,
pp. 125-126, included in the Addendum as Exhibit "A") establish
that Appellant's counsel was ineffective as follows:
We came in here this morning with the understanding, and
we have statements that Monte Johnston was going to take
the stand and testify that Mr. Penman was the one who
shot Mr. Nielson. he has now chosen to not appear and it
appears now that the evidence that the State has before
this Court is simply one of that he was a party and that
he walked in. Of course, our position is that Mr. Penman
is not the one who shot Mr. Nielson. This afternoon we
would have attempted to research this more fully but our
office, our library is torn up, we are in the process of
moving. And because first of all we didn't anticipate
that we would be at this juncture with only the evidence
that he walked in there and a gunshot was heard, and
because we don't have the access to our library we don't
feel comfortable in fully representing our client and not
being able to brief the issue.
Not only was Appellant's counsel prevented preparing for the
preliminary hearing and from addressing certain issues because

1

Johnston was absent and their library and office was torn up and
they were in the process of moving, but they were also not notified
by the state that Johnston absconded before being subpoenaed.
Regardless of whether defense counsel's actions were competent
or could be classified as sound trial strategy does not undermine
the fact that both the Court and the Appellant were misled in this
case.

A defendant's attorney is required to "provide

counsel"

whenever

the

attorney's

client

faces

a

[truthful]
substantial

probability of the deprivation of his liberty (Utah Code Ann. § 7732-301(1)); that counsel is required to "provide investigatory and
other facilities necessary for a complete defense" (Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-32-301(3)); not merely a defense geared toward plea negotiations; that counsel is required to assure undivided loyalty to the
client (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301(4)); that counsel is required to
counsel and defend their client at every stage of the criminal
proceedings (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-304(1) (a)) .
When decisions lead to the waiver of constitutional rights
such as those involved with the waiver of self-incrimination, trial
by jury and a voluntary or knowing plea, the defendant possesses
the right to assist in his defense and to be truthfully counseled
and fully informed of the nature of the case against him by his
counsel

(as well as the prosecutor) in order to make rational,
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informed, voluntary and knowledgeable

decisions concerning his

legal options and the relinquishment of his liberty.
is not acting freely.

Otherwise he

An assumption (like the one proposed by the

plaintiff) that a defendant in a criminal case would have upon the
advice of his attorneys

(or full knowledge) pleaded guilty to a

charge of murder even if he had been fully informed is an insufficient predicate for a conviction on that charge.

See Henderson v.

Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 643-44, n.12 (1976).
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the
reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings,
the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity
to show that it is untrue. While this is important in
the case of documentary evidence, it is even more
important where the evidence consists of the testimony of
individuals whose memory might be faulty, or who, in fact
might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice,
vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.
Greene v. McElrey. 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1959).
Appellant specifically stated on page 24 of in his principal
memorandum as follows:
At the time of the entry of his pleas, he believed that
both Mr. Johnston and Mr. Lewis had turned State's
witness and would be testifying against him. This was a
significant factor in his decision to enter the plea
agreement.
Contrary to Appellee's assertion that Appellant would not have
entered into the plea agreement even if he was aware of the three
3

documents he claims to have had no prior knowledge of (Appellee's
Brief, p. 34) the state's case was relatively weak.

The State's

primary witness and the Appellant's accuser (Monte "Bo" Johnston)
in addition to failing to appear in court to testify, also admitted
to lying in at least one of his unsworn statements provided to the
County Attorney's office and possessed a Utah arrest record for
providing police with "false information."
Further,

State's

witness

Rick

(R. 9.)

Lewis

testified

falsely

concerning his immunity agreement with the State and also possessed
ulterior motives to testify.

(R. 38-39.)

Between the dates of November 1, 1987 and November 14, 1987,
Midvale Police obtained confessions (for the same crimes in which
the Appellant was charged and convicted) by two juvenile suspects.
(R. 5, 6 and 78.)
Moreover, there exists substantial exculpatory (or at the very
least inconclusive) evidence concerning ballistic tests conducted
by

the Washington, D.C.

FBI

Criminal

Laboratory

as set

forth

herein.
In short, there is very little if anything at all in the
record other than testimony tainted by perjury that implicates that
Appellant was even at the scene of the crime in question.

There is

no evidence whatsoever establishing that Appellant did more than
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come into the possession of stolen property after the occurrence of
a robbery-homicide committed by Rick Lewis and Monte Johnston.
On the other hand, had the Appellant been aware that he was
admitting to being a murderer he would have rather faced trial by
jury than being branded with the stigma of committing a homicide
which he did not commit.
The fact that other charges may have been dismissed against
the Appellant is irrelevant to the determination of this appeal,
since

the Appellant

was

nevertheless

convicted

as

the

actual

murderer and, the State's representations in the plea affidavit and
in their letter to the Utah State Board of Pardons addressing the
State's

inability

to prove

that

the Appellant

is

the

actual

perpetrator of that homicide are meaningless as well as non-binding
upon the Board of Pardons.

In fact, the Utah State Board of

Parsons notified Appellant that the criminal record in his case was
"unclear" and "inconclusive" and, that that record would remain
unclear and inconclusive unless the Appellant confessed to killing
the victim in this case.
The

State

is

holding

the

Appellant

accountable

as

the

"shooter" and/or as the actual perpetrator of the homicide on the
basis that the language of the plea agreement is ambiguous.

The

plea bargain is ambiguous in that it was conditioned upon the fact
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that the Appellant would not be held accountable as the actual
perpetrator (or "shooter") of the homicide but nevertheless, based
upon the wording of the plea affidavit he is being held accountable
as the trigger-man absent an admission by either himself or Monte
Johnston to having killed the victim.
In short, the issue of factual guilt has never been removed
from this case.

Moreover, the pleas would never have been entered

had the Appellant been fully counseled by his attorney.

II.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT PREJUDICED APPELLANT AND A
LEGITIMATE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT
WOULD HAVE BOUND OVER THE DEFENDANT TO DISTRICT
COURT IS EVIDENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD.

Admittedly, appellant's original counsel may have stipulated
in good faith based upon the prosecutor's fraudulent representation
that Johnston (the Appellant's accuser) was subpoenaed.

However,

neither the good faith of defense counsel nor the good faith of the
prosecuting attorney is an issue in this appeal.

Moreover, Monte

Johnston absconded from Wyoming Probation Authorities the day prior
to when he was to be served.

Nevertheless, to assert that the

Appellant has failed to show that Johnston's absence deprived him
of the opportunity to show that another (i.e. Johnston) and not the
Appellant committed the crime in question or, that all evidence
tends to show that Johnston's presence at the preliminary hearing
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would

have

been

damaging,

since

only

Johnston

claimed

that

Appellant had actually shot the victim (Crim. Tr. 202), belies the
fact

that

the

purpose

of

the

preliminary

examination

is

to

determine if a crime was committed and if Appellant was the one who
committed it.
The

court

determining

probable

cause

was

deprived

an

opportunity to view the Appellant's accuser's demeanor, and to
ascertain the veracity of the Appellant's accuser.

The Appellant

was deprived an adequate preliminary examination into the charges,
deprived an opportunity to address or impeach this witness, or to
present evidence of Johnston's previous State criminal record where
Johnston provided

false

information

to police.

In fact, the

State's only other witness Rick Lewis, implicated Johnston as the
perpetrator of the homicide.

Had Johnston been present at the

preliminary examination, the State would have impeached its own
case in chief against Appellant:
would

have

been

testifying

(one State's witness, Johnston,

that

the

Appellant

committed

the

homicide in question, while the other State's witness, Rick Lewis,
would have been testifying that the Appellant did not, in fact,
commit the crime).
Further, the prosecutor's elicitation of false and/or perjured
testimony from State's witness Lewis concerning his Meals with the
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State," his failure to correct that testimony as well as defense
counsel's failure to clarify the record concerning this matter also
tainted the fact-finding process and probable-cause-determination
function of the preliminary examination.
To suggest as Appellee does that there is nothing to indicate
that the circuit court, even if knowing of these improprieties,
would not have bound over the defendant, ignores the fact that this
very same court initially declined from binding the Appellant over
on the homicide charge (Prelim. Transcript, pp. 124-132).

The fact

that the State was presenting ambiguous alternative theories of the
crime and/or the Appellant's conduct affected the Court's decision.
By bootstrapping in this manner, the State alleged that the
Appellant was either a party to intentionally and knowingly committing the homicide or a party to the commission of a felony (either
theft, burglary or robbery) where during its commission, attempted
commission or immediate flight from the commission thereof the
victim

was

killed.

Or,

that

the

Appellant

aided,

abetted,

solicited or encouraged another to commit the homicide.
ambiguities

have

never

been

resolved

irrespective

These
of

the

Appellant's pleas in this case.
Moreover, the State did not want Johnston present at the
preliminary

hearing

as evidenced
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by their

failure

to

issue a

warrant for Johnston's arrest after purportedly being subpoenaed
and failing to appear.

Further, as evidenced by the prosecutor's

strenuous objections at the preliminary examination concerning all
inquiry pertaining to this State's witness (Prelim. Transcript, pp.
79-85, 92-95, 97, 98, 101). Furthermore, the absence of any goodfaith efforts to either locate him or to ensure Johnston's presence
at the court proceedings also establishes the State's fear of
having Johnston present at the preliminary hearing.
"This is not a case in which [Appellant] challenges the skill
and competency of trial counsel in the negotiation process or in
advice given regarding acceptance or rejection of a proposed plea
bargain" per se.
1988) .

State v. Colonna, 766 P. 2d 1062, 1068

(Utah

Nor does the defendant lose sight of the fact that our

state and federal constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea
bargains.

See id.

To the contrary, the defendant clearly recognizes that our
state and federal constitutions guarantees fair trials and that
both constitutions still guarantee due process at critical stages
of the criminal proceedings.

This is a case where counsel was not

given, and indeed, where it may have been hampered by the State.
The defendant is not arguing that his counsel failed to bargain
properly, but that he accepted a plea bargain and waived his right
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to a fair trial without being fully informed of the full nature of
the

case

against

him.

The

pleas

were

entered

without

full

knowledge.

III. THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED TO ENGAGE A DEFENDANT
IN AN ELEMENTS COLLOQUY AND TO CORRECT OR CLARIFY
AMBIGUITIES IN THE PLEA AFFIDAVITS.
Appellee represents that the trial court is not required to
expressly address all the elements of "Rule 11" (of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure) in the plea colloquy if they are specified
in the plea affidavit.

Appellant agrees.

However, Appellant

submits that while the trial court may not be required to expressly
address all the elements of Rule 11. the court is nevertheless
mandated to expressly address all the factual elements of the
"crime" with the defendant.

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-

13 (Utah 1987).
The trial court is also required during the plea hearing to
clarify

"any omissions or ambiguities" as well as "any uncer-

tainties" in defendant's plea affidavit or otherwise arising in the
plea colloquy.

State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991)

cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
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IV.

APPELLEE'S
REPRESENTATIONS
PERTAINING
TO
THE
BALLISTICS REPORT OMIT RELEVANT EXCULPATORY FACTS
WHICH ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO AN INTERPRETATION OF A
REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellee

asserts that the results of the FBI's ballistic

examination could only be characterized as inconclusive or inculpatory when in fact, appellee omits relevant exculpatory facts and
portions of that laboratory analysis in support of that contention.
Omitted Facts:

The shotshell wad recovered from the

victim while being similar in appearance with the type of
wad commercially loaded by Fiocchi into shotshells like
those submitted for testing also possessed identifying
marks that "could not be associated with the marks left
on wads test-fired" from the barrel of the weapon in
question.
Therefore, no conclusion could be reached as to whether the
shotshell

[specimen! recovered from the scene of the crime was

fired from the alleged murder weapon.
Further, no conclusion could be reached as to whether the
shotshells allegedly recovered from the defendant or State's witness Monte Johnston were ever loaded into the rifle.

(R. 240-41.)

A medical examiner testifying at the defendant's preliminary
examination

testified

that

while

11

possessing

the

ability

to

determine the type of bullets or pellets in question failed to do
so in this case.

(Prelim. Transcript, p. 118, 11. 17-21):

Q.
Were you able to tell, again based upon your
experience in this type of matter, what type of bullet or
pellets they were?
A.
I'm able to do that but I must say I did not in
this instance.
Testimony was submitted at the defendant's preliminary hearing
that at least one other person was armed with a shotgun during the
commission of the crime.

(Prelim. Transcript pp. 45-46.)

Q.
What about your brother [Rick Lewis], Devon?
Did you have occasion to observe whether or not he was
armed?
A.

Yes.

Additionally,

He was carrying a 12-gauge pump shotgun

another

shotgun

rifle

was

recovered

from

Johnston's vehicle and based upon information and belief, a 12gauge shotgun shell (in addition to a 20-gauge shotshell wad) was
recovered by Midvale police detectives at the crime scene.
Additionally, other manufacturers of shotshells from different
companies and different gauges of shotshells are also commercially
loaded with nickel-plated No. #6 shot.
load for all gauges of shotshells.1

]

No. #6 shot is a standard

A metallurgical analysis of a

For example, other gauges of shotgun rifles are capable of
firing No. 6 shot.
12

12-gauge shotshell loaded with No. 6 nickel-plated shot would, in
fact,

indicate

close

compositional

association

because

both

shotshells contain the same type of similar metals.
Furthermore,

Monte

xx

Bo"

Johnston,

who

initially

provided

information to authorities to the effect that the defendant shot
the decedent with a 20-gauge rifle not only failed to appear in
court but moreover possessed an arrest record for providing police
false information.

The only

other State's witness providing

testimony

that

defendant

was

testimony

in open court while under oath and in fact lied to

authorities

the

because

he

armed

"feared going

also

provided

to prison."

false

Det. Jerry

Thompson in discovering Rick Lewis' true identity confronted him at
that

time

(the

following

colloquy

occurred

between

Lewis

and

Thompson):
I then went down to the County Jail, where they were
getting in the process of releasing Rick Lewis. At that
time I confronted him with the story why he didn't tell
me that he was Devon's brother, Kevin Baer. He stated:
"I didn't think you would find out. I knew that I was
wanted and would possibly go to prison and I guess I
really didn't want to go there." . . .
(Sheriff's Report, Case No. 87-114571, 2/11/88, at p. 2, included
in the addendum as Exhibit "B".)
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V.

APPELLEE'S REPRESENTATION THAT THE APPELLANT FAILED
TO PRESENT AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
IS MISPLACED.

From the outset
brief

clearly

(and barring the fact that the defendant's

references

the

record

in this

case),

appellate

counsel and the original state-counsel assigned to this case agreed
that the entire record in this case (both of the criminal proceedings as well as the record from the habeas corpus proceedings
before Judge Bohling) would be made a part of the appellate record
in this matter.
It is, and was, appellate counsel's understanding that the
clerk of the trial court would provide those records in their
entirety to the appellate court for the purpose of this appeal.
Accordingly, while it appears that there is some confusion
concerning this matter, plaintiff's argument that appellate counsel
has failed to provide the record or portions thereof in support of
the defendant's claims is misplaced.

This argument is also moot

because this Court has ordered that the record be supplemented.
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VI.

DEFENDANT PROPERLY APPEALED FROM BOTH THE DENIAL OF
HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AS WELL AS FROM
THE DENIAL OF HIS PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, HIS CLAIMS WERE
PROPERLY RAISED BELOW AND/OR ARE NOW PROPERLY
BEFORE THIS COURT.

The Utah State Supreme Court "has frequently held that while
habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal (citation omitted), a
conviction may nevertheless be challenged by collateral attack in
'unusual circumstances' that is, where an obvious injustice or a
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has
occurred, irrespective of whether an appeal has been taken."

Hurst

v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).
In Hurst v. Cook, the Utah Supreme Court stated that
Numerous cases have arisen that have called in question
the fundamental justice of a conviction where the
issue [s] [were] not, or could not be, dealt with on
direct appeal.
Prime examples involve cases in which
issues arise outside the record, e.g. the subsequent
discovery of the suppression of exculpatory evidence
the ineffective assistance of counsel
especially in the investigation and preparation of a case
. . . the discovery of new exculpatory evidence . . . and
fraud committed upon the court by the knowing use of
false evidence.
. . .
We have also found unusual
circumstances and remanded for findings on the merits
where the record was inadequate to determine whether the
petitioner unintentionally pleaded guilty to a charge
higher than he intended and failed to appeal because of
his ignorance concerning his error.
(Id.

at

1036

n.6.)

A

collateral

appropriate.

15

attack

of

this

nature

is

Defendant presented the substance of his claims concerning the
preliminary examination to the lower court in his motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
"[j ] urisdictional
appeal."

As stated in defendant's principal brief,

issues may be

raised

for the

first

time on

State in Interest of R.N.J.. 908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct.

App. 1995) .
Utah recognizes that the right to a preliminary examination is
a substantial one.

State v. Pay, 146 P. 300, 304

(Utah 1915) .

Further, in Utah a preliminary examination is jurisdictional in
nature.

See State v. Freeman, 71 P.2d 196, 200 (Utah 1937).

A preliminary hearing to ascertain probable cause to bind an
accused for additional proceedings is a "critical stage of the
criminal process" at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
obtains.
court

In Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1200 (1973) the

offered

the

following

guidelines

regarding

preliminary

hearings:
the lawyer's skilled examination and cross-examination of
witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the prosecution's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse to
bind the accused over. Since the right to counsel is the
right to effective assistance of counsel [judicial
prudence] requires [the Court] to evaluate [Penman's]
challenge with the increased solicitude appropriate when
constitutional rights are at stake.
Coleman v. Burnett, 477 Fed. 1187 at 1200.
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Thus, a preliminary hearing is not only the occasion upon
which the Government must justify continued detention by
a showing of probable cause, but also an opportunity for
the accused to rebut that showing.
It is as much the
arrestee's prerogative to endeavor to minimize probable
cause as it is the Government's to undertake to maximize
it, and that both sides must be indulged reasonably in
their respective efforts.
Id. at 1204.
In sum, "the evidence" which alone must guide resolution
of the probable cause issue is the whole evidence—for the
defense as well as for the prosecution. The magistrate
must listen to the versions of all witnesses and observe
their demeanor and provide an opportunity to defense
counsel to explore their account on cross-examination.
The Sixth Amendment secures for the accused the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing having for its
purpose a determination on probable cause to hold him for
further proceedings. Among counsel's potential contributions, the Court stated, is "skilled examination . . . of
witnesses which may expose fatal weaknesses in the
prosecution's case that may lead the magistrate to refuse
to bind over the accused.
Id. (citations omitted).
[D] ue process demands more than the mere presence of
counsel at the hearing. . . .
[A]n accused is normally
entitled to subpoenas compelling the attendance at his
preliminary hearing of witnesses whose testimony promises
appreciable assistance on the issue of probable cause.
. . . [These principles do] not depend upon which side
might have been expected to call the witnesses.
Id.. at 1205.
In this case, the State alleged Johnston was the only one who
could identify the defendant as the one responsible for causing the
death of Spencer Nielson.

This witness did not testify at the

17

preliminary hearing.

To the extent that hearsay is employed, the

effort to establish probable cause becomes more prone to attack
since

the

reliability

of

the

absent

hearsay

becomes an added factor to be reckoned with.
The Government's evidence at

declarant

always

Id. at 1206.

[Penman's] preliminary hearing

was not only hearsay but also hearsay without any apparent means of
refutation whatever.

The constitutional guidelines set forth in

Coleman have clearly been violated in this case.
Finally, even if the defendant's IAD claims are improperly
before this Court, his claims addressing the denial and deprivation
of the preliminary examination is properly before this Court.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant asks this Court to
vacate his conviction and order his release from custody and/or for
any other relief deemed appropriate by this Court that is not
prejudicial to the Appellant.
DATED this / *f

day of October, 1997.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN_& MARTINEAU

By
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1

before?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

How many different occasions?

4

A

Several times.

5

Q

Was Mr. Johnston, did you have occasion to

6

observe whether or not Mr. Johnston was armed?

7

A

Yes, I did.

8

Q

What did he have?

9

A

He had a mini 14 rifle.

10

Q

What is a mini 14?

11

A

It's a short rifle about the size of an M16.

12

Kind of, it's shoots the same shells as an M16, it's

13

semiautomatic.

14
15

Q

When you say short, can you describe the length

A

Two and a half feet.

of it?

16
17

MS. PALACIOS:

18

A

19

I'm sorry, I didn't hear that.

Two and a half feet.
MR. IWASAKI:

What about your brother, DeVon?

20

Did you have occasion to observe whether or not he was

21

armed?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

What w a s — Describe it for me.

24

A

It was a single barrel single shot pump.

25

He was carrying a 12 gauge pump shotgun.

The

barrel on it was a 18 and a quarter, 18 and a half inches
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1

long.

2

Q

Why do you say 18 or a quarter inch long?

3

A

Because it was over legal limit.

4

Q

To your knowledge the legal limit for sawed off

5

shotguns was 18 inches?

6

A

I believe so.

7

Q

And this was specifically sawed off longer than

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

So going back to when Mr. Johnston and the

8

that?

11

defendant enter in to the living quarters of Mr. Nielson who

12

goes in first?

13

A

Mr. Johnston.

14

Q

How soon after does Mr. Penman go in?

15

A

Almost directly after.

16

Q

What do you see or hear at that time?

17

A

I here Mr. Johnston telling the guy to get out

18

of bed.

He did this a couple times, and I heard two

19

gunshots.

20

Q

Pardon me?

21

A

I heard two gunshots.

22

Q

What kind of gunshots did you hear?

23

A

They was from the mini 14, Johnston's gun.

24

Q

You had been around firearms enough that you

25

know the difference between a shotgun blast and mini 14
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1

MR. IWASAKI:

I'm going to object as to

2

relevance as to what this has to do with Mr. Penman.

Number

3

two, that Bo, Monte Johnston is not on trial, is not a party

4

to this action today, is not even a witness today.

5

to have some sort of extraneous impeachment of another

6

unnamed defendant and/or unpresent witness through the

7

testimony of Mr. Lewis is entirely improper.

8

going to impeach, you impeach Mr. Lewis you don't impeach

9

Mr. Johnston who hasn't testified.

To try

If you're

I object to relevance

10

and improper the use of testimony by Lewis to attempt to

11

impeach or to discredit someone who hasn't even been here

12

today.

13
14

THE COURT:

What is the relevance of the line

of questions?

15

MR. BRADSHAW:

Your Honor, the State elicited

16

testimony that, in fact, according to this witness,

17

Mr. Johnston and Mr. Penman were in the house at the time

18

this individual was killed, according to this witness's

19

testimony.

20

regards to Mr. Penman as well as to Mr. Johnston are

21

relevant.

22

things that he observed.

23

that'll be related.

24

the chop shop, it'll relate to testimony elicited by the

25

State concerning the stealing of the car prior to the

I think the facts surrounding this incident in

I'm asking for his own personal knowledge of
It goes to a number of the facts

The question I'm asking right now about
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1

alleged homicide and burglary and robbery as well as to a

2

number of other facts that later will be tied up.

3

MR. IWASAKI:

All of which have not indicated

4

any reason to impeach Monte Johnston.

He hasn't testified.

5

Now if Monte Johnston has testified maybe, maybe you could

6

get into prior wrongs but to try to elicit that from

7

Mr. Lewis, that is not applicable.

8

THE COURT:

I agree.

9

MR. BRADSHAW:

Your Honor, I'm not attempting

10

to impeach Mr. Johnston.

11

present to the Court so the Court can make a decision as to

12

whether probable cause exists or not.

13

of these individuals and what occurred at this date and

14

immediately prior to this date.

15
16

What I'm attempting to do is to

THE COURT:

All right.

The whole background

Confine it to the

incident in question and immediately prior to that.

17

MR. BRADSHAW:

Thank you, Your Honor.

By way

18

of background and for the Court, this is not involving

19

anything that would be considered prior bad acts or anything

20

of that nature.

21

You met Bo, you lived with him and at some

22

point during that time period you came to know Roger as

23

well?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

That was through Bo?
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1

MR.

IWASAKI:

He's asked him about this

2

specific incident and I don't have any problem with that and

3

that's as far as it

4

then say he's the leader on everything else that you all did

5

without saying what everything else i s —

6

should go.

THE COURT:

To put in an overflow and

I'm going to sustain the

7

objection.

8

particularly interested in anything except this particular

9

incident.

10

I don't see any relevance to it and I'm not

MR. BRADSHAW:

If I could respond briefly,

11

Your Honor.

The State as asking you to judge what occurred

12

on this incident in a vacuum.

13

happened on this occasion you have to see the background,

14

you have to see what has gone on before in order to see what

15

happened on this occasion.

I think in order to see what

16

THE COURT:

Why?

17

MR.

Because to understand the

BRADSHAW:

18

dynamics between these people and what occurred.

I mean the

19

State, basically there is no testimony as to what occurred

20

in relation to the homicide.

The State is going to ask you

21

to speculate in that regard.

And I think in order to see

22

the full picture you have to see the dynamics between these

23

four individuals.

24

THE COURT:

Mr.

25

MR. IWASAKI:

I deny that the Court needs to
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Iwasaki?

1

have any background as to dynamics.

2

resent Mr. Bradshaw stating the State's position is that I

3

am going to ask you to speculate.

4

Information and you know the law as well as anybody, Judge.

5

And I charged these parties and we needn't have to go in to

6

any specificity as to who was inside and what they did

7

because there were only two people that were inside that

8

could testify about it and neither one of them are

9

testifying today.

10
11

THE COURT:
Mr. Bradshaw.

12

And furthermore I

You can read the

The objection is sustained,

I don't want to hear about that.

MR. BRADSHAW:

On Hallowween, on this

13

occasion, you went to the home of this individual, Lewis

14

Torres is that his name?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And at that point DeVon and Roger and Bo were

17

already there?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Was it a situation where the three of you

20

approached Bo and talked him into not leaving with his wife

21

and child to go to San Diego?

22

A

No.

23

Q

That was not the scenario?

24

A

No.

25

Q

In fact, when you arrived the plan was being
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1

baked at that point; wasn't it?

2

A

I would say it was already made.

3

Q

It was already made and the maker of the plan

4

was Bo f Monte Johnston?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And pursuant to that plan which he conceived

7

you, not you but the other three of you, followed him to a

8

truck stop where he dropped off his spouse and his child?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

And to the best of your knowledge they stayed

11

there and waited for him while all this was going on?

12

A

Yes, I believe so.

13

Q

And subsequent to that again, at Bo's

14

direction, you went to find another pickup truck?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

To steal a pickup truck?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

And again it was Bo was giving the directions

19

as to where the truck, where you could find the truck and

20

how it could be stolen?

21

A

That is true.

22

Q

And that is something you had a good deal of

23

expertise in; isn't it?

24

MR. IWASAKI:

Objection.

25

THE COURT:

Overruled.
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Answer.

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

In fact, he gave you directions to a specific

3

location; true?

4

A

Uh huh (indicating affirmatively.).

5

Q

He got out of the car and he drove up just

6

minutes later with a pickup truck that you assumed he had

7

stolen?

8

A

That's true.

9

Q

And he was driving that truck?

10

A

He was.

11

Q

And he drove that truck and you and DeVon

12

followed in another truck?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

And at some point in Midvale you dropped off

15

Devon's truck?

16

A

Uh huh (indicating affirmatively.).

17

Q

And all four of you climbed in to the truck

18

with the handicapped license plates?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

Prior to the time you arrived at the, at this

21

location did Bo ever say anything to you in regards to not

22

wanting to participate in this event?

23

A

No.

24

Q

How about in regards to just being a lookout,

25

that he wouldn't be involved in the actual robbery or
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1

A

Not to ray knowledge.

2

Q

Sometime after that, after you had loaded up

3

all of the goods in to the truck, you and DeVon were sitting

4

in the cab of the truck I take it?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And you overheard a conversation between Bo,

7

Monte Johnston and Roger Penman?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

You assume it was Roger Penman?

10

A

It was the two of them.

11

Q

And at some point during that conversation you

12

hear Bo, Monte Johnston say something to the effect of he's

13

going to go back in to the house?

14

MR. IWASAKI:

Objection and move to strike.

15

As you can recall the original testimony, Your Honor,

16

subject to defense attorneys objections as to hearsay all I

17

was able to establish was that a conversation occurred and

18

he was unable to say who said what.

19

response to objection

20
21

by Counsel.

THE COURT:
Q

And that was in

That's correct.

So I would ask the record to be corrected.

22

MS. PALACIOS:

We didn't object to hearsay.

23

THE COURT:

Now Mr. Bradshaw, your question

24

again was, did he hear the conversation between Johnston and

25

the defendant?
92

1

MR. BRADSHAW:

2

characterization.

3

testimony.

4

different point of view.

5

here.

I think the problem here is the

I was not characterizing the prior

If the Court wants I'll approach it from a
I don't think there's a problem

I'll withdraw the question.

6

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

7

Q

You and DeVon were in the cab?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

And you overheard this conversation?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

It's hard, I understand, for you to remember

12

exactly who said what.

That's true; isn't it?

13

A

That's true.

14

Q

But you do have a recollection of the gist of

15

the conversation?

16

A

I got the meaning of it, yes.

17

Q

And you understood the meaning of that

18

conversation to be that Monte Johnston, Bo was going to go

19

in to that house and kill Spencer Nielson; didn't you?

20

MR. IWASAKI:

I object to that.

He can ask

21

him what the gist of the conversation is and I understand

22

that there's a considerable leeway on leading on cross

23

examination, Your Honor, but then he's characterizing which

24

has not been brought out on direct.

25

direct examination was a conversation was held, he didn't
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As you can recall the

1

know who said what but certain words were said and that was

2

it.

3

attribute those things to Mr. Johnston based upon whatever

4

understanding Mr. Lewis has of it is improper.

And then for Mr. Bradshaw then to say, then to

5

THE COURT:

I'll sustain the objection.

6

can ask him what he heard each one say.

7

MR. IWASAKI:

You

For the record I would move to

8

strike all this because it becomes very important later on

9

if what we are looking at the record of Mr. Lewis's
I would ask it be striken as a matter of law now

10

testimony.

11

and cannot be inquired into later if the testimony is to be

12

used and read back via the transcript.

13

MR. BRADSHAW:

I would ask a chance to respond

14

before the Court rules.

15

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

16

MR. BRADSHAW:

I'm not bound by Mr. Iwasaki's

17

direct examination.

I can ask him questions concerning

18

things that he did not elicit.

19

He testified, not in response to a direct question and we

20

can play it back if the Court would like, although he could

21

not remember exactly what was said he understood the meaning

22

of what was said.

23

exact words I'm asking him to relate, not in a leading

24

question, but relate to us as to what he understood that

25

meaning to be.

And

This is cross-examination.

although he doesn't remember the

That's not either overleading, I mean, I
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1

don't understand the objection.

There was about five

2

objections there but I don't see any of them apply,

3

asking him his understanding of what the meaning of that

4

conversation was.

5

exact words that were used.

I'm

He testified he doesn't remember the

6

MR. IWASAKI:

I have no objection to him

7

asking his understanding.

8

understanding and then puts in to words via question his

9

understanding without a response, then you've got a dual

But when he says your

10

question.

11

ask what his understanding was and let the answer come out.

12
13

THE COURT:

He can

Answer what your understanding of

the conversation was, Mr. Baer.

14
15

If that's the case I'll object to that.

A

I understood that they was meaning to go in and

finish Mr. Nielson off by murder.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

17

MR. BRADSHAW:

Okay, you say they.

It was

18

your understanding based on your hearing that conversation

19

that in fact, Bo was the one who was going to do it; want

20

it?

21

MR. IWASAKI:

Asked and answered.

22

MR. BRADSHAW:

Your Honor

23

THE COURT:

He may clarify that.

24
25

—
Can you

answer that question?
A

I'm not sure, for sure.
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I cannot, definitely I

1

don't know.

2
3

Q

5

A

conversation?
Not really.

I assumed it would be him just

from the nature of the man.

6
7

And you assumed it was Bo based on what you

heard in that

4

I assumed it was Bo at the time, yes.

Q
indicated

Was there anything in that conversation

that

it was anyone other than Bo?

8

A

No.

9

Q

So what you heard was consistent with your

10

conclusion that, in fact, it was Bo who was going to do that

11

act?

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

A

Once again, I don't know really.

I believed

at the time it would be Bo.
Q

Again there was nothing in that

conversation

which led you to believe it was going to be anybody else?
A

There was nothing really in the conversation

that led me to believe which one was going to do it.
Q

All right.

After the conversation and they

went in to the house you and DeVon remained in the truck?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Roger came out of the house first; isn't that

22

correct?

23

A

I believe so.

24

Q

Let me ask you this:

25

truck you heard a shot?
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While you were in the

1

A

Yes, I heard a shot.

2

Q

You weren't able to see at all what occurred

3

inside the house?

4

A

No, I wasn't,

5

Q

The next thing you saw was Roger coming out of

6

the house?

7

A

Roger and Bo right after himf yes.

8

Q

But Roger came out first?

9

A

I think so, yes.

10

Q

You did not see Roger with the shotgun at that

12

A

I didn't see him have it, no.

13

Q

Although you didn't see what occurred you've

11

14

time?

testified that you assumed that Bo did it?

15

A

That's what I said, yes.

16

Q

And that assumption is based on a number of

17

factors; isn't it?

18

A

Yes, it is.

19

Q

It's based in part on how you observed Bo

20

beating Mr. Nielson prior that evening; is that true?

21

A

That's true.

22

Q

It's based in part on how you've seen Bo beat

23
24
25

other people; true?
MR. IWASAKI:

Objection as to whether or not

he had seen Bo beat other people.
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Move to strike.

1

THE COURT:

Sustained.

2

MR. IWASAKI:

Once again prior bad acts.

3

MR. BRADSHAW:

It's based in part on your

4

observance of, your observing Bo, Monte Johnston just prio

5

to it and just prior to that shotgun blast you heard?

6

A

Just prior to a shotgun blast?

7

Q

Just prior and just after, you're

8
9
10
11

observing

him, you're seeing how he acted and what he was doing
A

It happened so fast I didn't really pick up t

many vibs, I guess.
Q

It's based in part on your observance of thos

12

two individuals not only on that occasion but prior

13

occasions?

14
15

MR. IWASAKI:
reference

16
17

Once again objection to any

to prior occasions.
MR. BRADSHAW:

It's not asking for prior bad

acts, it's just asking for interaction of those two.

18

MR. IWASAKI:

He's asking whether this guy h

19

an opinion whether or not he assumes somebody killed

20

somebody and then he says he's not basing it on any prior

21

bad acts.

22

Well of course he is.
THE COURT:

Would that answer be based on

23

prior specific acts you had observed the defendant and

24

Mr. Johnston do or just general observation?

25

A

It would be based on overall character, yes,
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1
2

-which would mean prior acts and everything.

Just the man in

general.

3

THE COURT:

4

A

5

I'll let him answer.

What was the question?
MR. BRADSHAW:

The question was would this

6

conclusion, this assumption you've made about who killed

7

Spencer Nielson be based in part on your observing the

8

interaction, the prior relating and observing of the two

9

people, Roger Penman and Monte Johnston?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

After you left you and your brother were in one

12

truck and the other two were in the other truck; is that

13

true?

14

go for like a block and then you split up?

Immediately after you leave the place, you all four

15

A

We all went to downtown Midvale.

16

Q

There's really no conversation about what has

17
18
19
20
21

happened?
A

Not really.

We just, the extent of the

conversation was meet back at the house.
Q

And you met back at the house and you loaded

everything into Monte Johnston's truck?

22

A

We loaded it in to a tent then a truck.

23

Q

Then to Monte Johnston's truck.

24
25

DeVon and Roger rode in one truck to Evanston?
A

Yes.
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Then you and

1
2

Q

Basically the plan in Evanston was to get rid

of the goods and to get rid of Monte Johnston?

3

A

Basically true, yes.

4

Q

And as soon as that was accomplished you and

5

Roger and Devon hightailed it back to Salt Lake?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

None of you were interested in the proceeds

8

from the heist?

9

A

Nof none of us.

10

Q

And certainly none of you were interested in

11

being near or around Monte Johnston?

12

A

That's true.

13

Q

And in fact, Monte Johnston is the one who sold

14

and received all the proceeds from this heist to the best of

15

your knowledge?

16

A

17
18

anything.
Q

19
20

To my knowledge he is the only one that sold

May I have a moment?
THE COURT:

You may.

(Discussion off the record between defense attorneys.)

21

MR. BRADSHAW:

Just a couple of more

22

questions.

Were you contacted by Monte Johnston subsequent

23

to his arrest on soliciting funds for bail or for anything?

24

A

After he was arrested?

25

Q

Yes?
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1

A

I was contacted, yes,

2

Q

Monte Johnston did call you?

3

A

No, he contacted me by letter or by mail.

4

Q

Do you still have that letter?

5

A

If I do I don't know where it's at.

6

Q

What was the gist of the letter?

7

MR. IWASAKI:

8

THE COURT:

9

Objection, that's hearsay.

How does that, can that be exempted

from the Hearsay Rule?

10

MR. BRADSHAW:

I'm not sure it does.

You

11

testified that at some point, I think this was your

12

testimony, well let me ask you this first:

13

Halloween night was Bo, to the best of your recollection,

14

wearing boots, cowboy boots, if you can recall?

15
16
17

A

I can't even remember.

On this

He was probably wearing

combat boots but I'm not sure.
Q

You testified that Roger had a 20 gauge shotgun

18

on that occasion.

19

storage shed?

You saw that before you ever went to the

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Once this incident started, once you went in to

22

the house did you see him with that shotgun at any time

23

after that point?

24

A

Once we was in the house?

25

Q

Yes?
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1

MS. PALACIOS:

Okay, on the last page you say

2

on the additional pellets exit the liver, additional pellets

3

are found within the liver.

4

A

Right.

5

Q

So there were no exits—

6

A

No, Ma'am.

7

Q

Would that have any significance with respect

8

to the distance that the s h o t —

9

A

No, actually it wouldn't in that shotgun

10

pellets, particularly smaller ones such as this, are very

11

unlikely to exit the body if one is shot in the trunk.

12

Q

Did you save those pellets?

13

A

I would take a representative sample and

14

receipt those to the law enforcement agency.

15

Q

Did you do that in this case?

16

A

Yes, Ma'am.

1^

Q

Were you able to tell, again based upon your

18

experience in this type of matter, what type of bullet or

X9

pellets they were?

%0

A

21

this instance.

22

Q

I'm able to do that but I must say I did not in

Okay.

The injuries that you described you

23

indicated there were some on the head and the neck and the

24

face?

25

A

Correct.
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1
2

THE COURT:

You may.

(Discussion off the record between Counsel.)

3

MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, we have just reached

4

a stipulation with the Prosecutor that the evidence that we

5

would offer at this time is that if the authorities who

6

performed these duties were called, and I believe it was

7

Detective Thompsen and representatives of the County

8

Attorneys Office, they would testify that Monte Johnston

9

also known as Bo, was subpoenaed, served a subpoena to

10

testify in this matter and I think that the record can

11

reflect that Mr. Johnston is not present and Mr. Iwasaki

12

indicates he has made no contact with their office and that

13

would be our stipulation.

14

MR. IWASAKI:

That's correct, Your Honor.

15

THE COURT:

All right.

15

MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, if I could at this

17

time advise Mr. Penman.

Roger, you have a right to make a

18

statement at this time subject to cross examination by the

19

Prosecutor.

20

own behalf subject to that same cross examination.

21

and I advise you today is that you make no statement and you

22

call no witnesses.

You also have a right to call witnesses on your
What Jim

Do you wish to follow our advice?

23

MR.

PENMAN:

Yes, I do.

24

THE COURT:

Argument?

25

MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, we have what we
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1

think is a difficult issue here with respect to the Felony

2

Murder Rule.

3

opportunity to brief this matter before we argue on that.

4

We would request the Court to allow us an

MR. IWASAKI:

I would object to that, Your

5

Honor.

This is a case in which the State has chosen to

6

charge a second degree murdered based upon the various

7

subsections therein, either as parties to intentionally

8

knowing and committing the homicide or as parties to the

9

commission of a felony, being an aggravated robbery,

10

aggravated burglary.

11

course, if the Court needs edification, of course we will

12

but it appears to me this is a fairly straight forward case.

13

I don't see the difficulties in arguing at this time.

14

I see no reason to brief it.

Of

The evidence has been presented that a

15

participant in the crime itself has given testimony as to

16

what occurred and identified the Defendant as being party

17

thereto.

18

thefts and that the value thereof of the items that were

19

taken.

20

consistent with previous testimony, is that of a shotgun

21

wound.

22

this matter.

23

there's no problem.

I've had value witnesses on the loss as to the

I have a medical examiner who says cause of death,

I don't see the reason

why we should have to brief

Like I say, if the Court needs edification

24

THE COURT:

I don't think I need a brief.

25

MS. PALACIOS:

Your Honor, we do and if I
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1

could explain w h y .

We came in here this m o r n i n g w i t h

the

2

u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and we have statements that Monte

3

w a s going to take the stand and testify that M r . P e n m a n w a s

4

the one w h o shot M r , N i e l s o n .

5

appear and it a p p e a r s now that the evidence that the

6

h a s before this Court is simply one of that he was a party

7

and that he w a l k e d in.

8

M r . Penman is not the one w h o shot M r . N i e l s o n .

9

a f t e r n o o n we w o u l d have attempted to research this m o r e

Johnston

He has now chosen to not
State

Of c o u r s e , our p o s i t i o n is that
This

10

fully but our o f f i c e , our library is torn u p , we are in the

11

p r o c e s s of m o v i n g .

12

a n t i c i p a t e that we would be at this juncture with only the

13

e v i d e n c e that he walked in there and a gunshot was h e a r d ,

14

and b e c a u s e we don't have the access to our library we d o n ' t

15

feel c o m f o r t a b l e in fully representing our client and not

16

b e i n g able to brief the i s s u e .

17

^

18
19

And b e c a u s e first of all we d i d n ' t

THE COURT:

I'll

MR.

If I may respond to t h a t , Your

IWASAKI:

let them do it just s o - -

Honor.

20

THE COURT:

You m a y .

21

MR. IWASAKI:

The fact that their p o s i t i o n

may

22

be that M r . P e n m a n didn't commit the actual h o m i c i d e , d i d n ' t

23

shoot a n y b o d y , is b e g g i n g the q u e s t i o n .

24

as to t h a t .

25

is the trigger m a n in this m a t t e r .

There is no

issue

He d o e s n ' t have to be shown to be the one w h o
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You know as well as I do

1

what parties are and that's all we're doing here.

2

no doubt there was an Ag-robbery/Ag-burglary.

3

evidence to the contrary.

4

Rule we don't have to.

5

altogether and I have no objection to briefing it if the

6

State charged first degree murdered in this matter.

7

aggravating circumstances, alleged that it occurred in the

8

course of the underlying felonies as we've said.

9

fact that I haven't shown that Penman killed anybody

It would be a separate issue

specifically is irrelevant to this matter.

11

are clear on that.
MR.

There's no

And if it is a Felony Murdered

10

12

There's

And as

But the

The legal issues

What good is briefing it going to do?
BRADSHAW:

I take issue with that and

13

that, in fact, is the point that we would wish to brief.

14

think there is little question that the Court would bind

15

over on the aggravated robbery, on the aggravated burglary

16

as a party to the offense but it does not follow that the

17

Court has probable cause to bind over on the homocide.

18

what we would ask an opportunity to brief the Court on is

19

precisely that issue, does party liability involved with

20

aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary necessarily create

21

the grounds for a bindover on the homicide.

22

it's not and we would ask an opportunity to try to convince

23

the Court of that as well.

24
25

MR. IWASAKI:

And

And we submit

Even the examination of

Mr. Lewis, Mr. Bradshaw went to great length to show what
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I

1

general knowledge or assumptions there was of what was going

2

to happen inside there and Mr. Lewis wasn't even inside that

3

room.

4

actual handling of anything that occurred in the room

5

leading up to the murder there's two people that knew what

6

happened in that room.

7

bind over on the murder is begging the question once again.

8

Of course there is.

9

by the fact that we've proven an Ag-robbery/Ag-burglary.

Mr. Penman was inside that room.

So if knowledge and

Whether or not that's sufficient to

I'm not saying we're coat tailing this

10

We've also shown someone died and he was one of two people

11

that was in the room when the shotgun blast went out.

12

not bootstraping it.

13

and that's a party element as to the second degree murder.

I'm

I have independent evidence of that

14

THE COURT:

Isn't that true?

15

MR. BRADSHAW:

I do not think that makes him

16

party to the second degree murder.

17

h e ' s — It seems to me there's two theories here and I think

18

you have to clarify and that's why I think it needs to be

19

briefed because this is a complex issue.

20

which Mr. Iwasaki articulated initially seems to be because

21

it's a burglary/robbery therefore, there's a felony murder

22

rule in Utah and he's a party to the homocide.

23

take issue with that, say that's not true and would ask the

24

opportunity to show case law to the Court on that issue.

25

If we're to find that

The first theory

And we would

The second theory which the State has
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1

articulated is he's a party to the homocide because he was

2

in the room.

3

they have to show he had the mental state required for the

4

offense number one.

5

aided, solicited, encouraged, commanded that sort of thing.

6

All we're asking for is an opportunity to brief the Court

7

fully on what the proper standard is and brief those

8

theories.

9

case because of the nature the way the evidence has

In order to show he's a party to the homicide

And number two, that he intentionally

Quite frankly, Your Honor, this is a complicate

10

transpired we would ask an opportunity to brief it to the

11

Court.

12

MR. IWASAKI:

Counsel is making it more

13

complicated than it is.

14

testimony that Mr. Penman was in possession of that 20 guage

15

shotgun and a shotgun blast went off in the room.

16

whatever assumptions for the purposes of this hearing can be

17

made, Your Honor, I think they are making it much more

18

complicated than it is for the purposes of this hearing.

19

THE COURT:

It is uncontroverted on the

So

I kind of agree, Mr. Iwasaki, but

20

I'm going to give them a chance to brief it to cover all

21

bases.

22

So that the issues are narrowed as to Counts 2,

23

3 and 4 and 5 I find probable cause to believe that those

24

offenses were all committed and that the Defendant committed

25

them and order him bound over for arraignment on that
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1

matter.

I would give you, would a week be enough for submit

2

your brief on Count 1?

3

MR. BRADSHAW:

The difficulty is, Your Honor,

4

we are in transition right now.

5

We have a library sort of half way in.

6

MS. PALACIOS:

We have law clerks who are

7

putting the library together.

8

we apologize to

9
10

Our office is all torn up.

We apologize to the Court and

Mr. Iwasaki.

THE COURT:

You can't help that.

How much time

do you need?

11

MS. PALACIOS:

Two weeks.

12

THE COURT:

All right.

13

MR. IWASAKI:

If that's the case, Your Honor,

14

he also has a request for disposition of detainers and

15

that's another way I want this thing to go along in an

16

orderly manner.

17
18
19

THE COURT:

All that's waived by their

MR. IWASAKI:

That's what I specifically want

request.

20

the record to show that the time from now until the time

21

this is briefed and bound over that in fact, he is waiving.

22

And I would like an oral agreement to that, that he's

23

waiving that time as to disposition of detainers

24

THE COURT:

You understand that, Counsel?

25

MR. BRADSHAW:

We have discussed that with
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1

Mr. Penman and he's ready to acknowledge on the record the

2

two weeks that is required for the preparation of that issue

3

on the interstate agreement on detainers would not count

4

against his 180 days for request for disposition.

5
6

THE COURT:

Prosecutor time to respond too.

7
8

MR. BRADSHAW:

I assume another two weeks on

THE COURT:

So that would be four weeks

MR. BRADSHAW:

Are you willing to accept four

that.

9
10

You would have to give the

then.

11
12

weeks of time in terms of your interstate agreement on

13

detainers would be waived?

14

MR.

PENMAN:

15

THE COURT:

Yes, I am.
All right then.

Brief from the

16

defense will be due by the last day of this month, June

17

30th.

Response by the Prosecutor by Thursday, July 14th.

18
19

MR. IWASAKI:

decision by phone or are you going to reconvene?

20
21

And will we be notified of your

THE COURT:

I'll have you reconvene and

have the Defendant brought up.

22

MR. BRADSHAW:

Do you want to set a date for

24

THE COURT:

By Thursday, July 21st.

25

MS. PALACIOS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

23

that now?
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1
2

MR. BRADSHAW:
21st, Your Honor?

What time would that be the

I'm sorry.

3

THE COURT:

4

WHEREUPON, the proceedings were adjourned at

5

2:00 p.m.

the hour of 2:35 p.m.

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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DOB: 10-01-62
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WENDELL DEVON BAER
DOB: 09-09-50
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SUSPECT VEHICLE:

N/A

D.

NARRATIVE OF REPORT:

On 02-10-88 this detective made contact v/ith the Van Wert Ohio
Sheriff's Office with a Captain Anderson, phone: (419) 238-3866. I
inquired of him if he was faniliar v/ith thp npVnn n a pr fann'iv back
there.
I gave him an address of
which was supposedly the parents of DeVon Baer, a Dan, and a Pearl.
He stated that he was familiar with the family, has known them for
many, many years.
They have not seen DeVon for a long time. I
informed him at that time that we had murder warrants on him, asked
him if he would check and see what he could come up with.
At that time he asked me if DeVon's brother, Kevin, was with him
during that murder.
I told him I didn't know that he had a brother.
I told him we did come up with some identification of a name of Kevin
Baer and that we had an individiial in our jail' who was going by the
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name of RICK LEWIS, that was called by everyone here as his brother,
but he denies it, and that oir rap sheet shows him as a RICK LEWIS,
however I asked for a description and also asked him to read me his
fingerprint classification.
He gave me his description of a KEVIN
EUGENE
BAER, with a date of birth *of
as the same
description as RICK LEWIS.
The date of births are different.
RICK
LEWIS is using the date of b'rth of
rather than
The fingerprint classification that they read to me is exactly the
same one as I have in Salt Lake.

IARRATIVE OF REPORT: C o n ' t

They also informed me that they have warrants out for him, that he is
on NCIC, has been wanted since 1982, didn't show up for a sentencing
to go to the state prison on a drug charge.
At that time I told him that I would get right back with him . . if
they would please send me their fingerprints and photo as soon as
they could, that he was getting ready to get out of jail.
I then went down to the County Jail, where they were getting in the
process of releasing MR, RICK LEWIS.
At that time I confronted him
with the story why he didn't tell me that he v/as DeVon's brother,
KEVIN BAER, He stated, "I didn't think you would find out . . I knew
that I was wanted and would possibly go to prison and I guess I
really didn't want to go there."
He stated, "I still have not
changed my mind, I will keep rn/ part of the bargain. I will testify
and will do everything else thai; I told you I would."
He was then informed that I had no control over the NCIC hit out of
Ohio, that I would have to file that charge on him at this time. I
would be in contact with him and my further contact would be with his
attorney, Kevin Kamada, v/ho was also notified of the situation.
A fugitive from justice warrant was obtained from Dick Shepherd at
the County Attorney's Office and signed by this detective in from of
Judge McCleave and served in the jail on 02-10-88. That was under
case #88-11580, which a copy of that will be attached to this case.

Reporting Deputy

Det. Jerry Thompson 141/D

Deputy Number

.',

Afton

L t . Forbc]
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Further communication will be clone with Ohio in the attorney's office
to get the final disposition on the case and what they are going to
do in regards to him.

IARRATIVE OF REPORT: Con't

RECOVERED ITEMS:

N/A

leporting Deputy

Det. Jer y Thompson H l / D

Deputy Number

I

Afton

Lt. Forbid

